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In this paper, I consider the problem of truth telling through the notion of 
parrhesia as developed and explicated in Foucault’s last lectures at the College 
de France (1982–1983 and 1983–1984) and the figure of the pariah that runs 
throughout Arendt’s work. In tracing connections and tensions in the way the 
two thinkers explore questions and dilemmas around the courage to tell the truth 
in philosophy and politics, I look into the current climate within the UK acade- 
mia, where there is a lot of ambivalence about whether people mean what they 
say or say what they mean anymore. In a Foucauldian mode of inquiry, I raise 
the question: what is the role of the academic when going through ‘dark times’, 
vis-à-vis questions of truth telling; what are the conditions of possibility for 
truth telling itself to be recognised as a question or a problem and how can we 
start mapping the effects of what we as academics do or refrain from doing? 
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‘Just as it is philosophy’s task to unite truth and freedom, so it is the equally hercu- 
lean task of politics to bring freedom and justice together’,1 Heinrich Blücher was 
writing to Jaspers, in September 1961 soon after he and Hannah Arendt had visited 
Karl and Gertrud Jaspers at their Basel home.2 Among the many things that he ]dis- 
cusses in this letter, written in the wake of the construction of the Berlin wall, Blü- 
cher particularly refers to Jasper’s book, The Idea of the University, which had just 
been translated in English (Jaspers 1961). In this book Jaspers considers the role of 
the academic and her/his relation to politics, a theme that Blücher was deeply inter- 
ested in. Not having any formal academic title, Blücher was a highly esteemed phi- 
losophy teacher at the New English School for Social Research and later at Bard 
College; ‘the education of the young’ in truth and freedom was at the heart of his 
teaching. As he was noting at the end of his letter to Jaspers: ‘They [the young] are 
asking for the truth. If we respond correctly, can’t we perhaps interest them in free- 
dom?’3 Blücher’s epistolary question has been at the heart of philosophical debates 
and literary texts since the antiquity, but it is particularly crucial today when aca- 
demic education is entering a regime of ‘dark times’. How is it possible to think 
and act within ‘dark times?’ This is the central question that I address in this essay 
by looking into the politics and practices of truth telling through the Foucauldian 
notion of parrhesia and the Arendtian figure of the pariah. 
	  
	  	  
Parrhesia preoccupied Michel Foucault at the end of his life as a critical notion 
in a genealogy of the relationship between philosophy and politics (Foucault 2008, 
2009). The latter has also been a constant preoccupation for Arendt, particularly 
through her experience of how the German academic circles she was  part  of, 
reacted or rather did not react to the rise of Nazism in Germany. Indeed, shortly 
before she left Germany in 1933, Arendt was terrified not by what the Nazis were 
doing, but by the way the German intellectual circles did not respond to what was 
happening, lost as they were in their philosophical reflections. As she boldly put it 
in a 1964 interview with Günter Gauss, ‘the problem, the personal problem was not 
what our enemies did but what our friends did’ (1994, 11). 
The essay is in four parts. In the first section, I explore philosophical links and 
influences between Foucault and Arendt. Then in the second section, I discuss Fou- 
cault’s elaboration of the notion of parrhesia, mainly drawing on his two  last 
courses at the Collège de France in 1982–1983 and 1983–1984. The third section 
examines the figure of the pariah in Arendt’s work, while in the final section I con- 
sider the role of the academic in ‘dark times’, in the context of practices of truth 
telling. 
	  
	  
1. Philosophical encounters 
While a number of scholars have already charted connections between Foucault and 
Arendt,4 to the best of my knowledge there is not a single reference to each other 
in the body of their own work, although they were both imbued with the French 
and German philosophical traditions and they had become philosophical celebrities 
in the USA. It was probably too late for Arendt to have noted Foucault’s work, but 
Foucault must have surely encountered Arendt’s oeuvre. Having myself delved in 
both philosophers’ work for the last 15 years I have found striking interfaces not 
only in the intellectual founding of their theorisation, but more importantly in lines 
of thought that I will argue considerably criss-cross the multilevelled and often con- 
flicting planes of their political philosophy. In thus following lines of  already 
charted connections between Foucault and Arendt, in this essay I consider a geneal- 
ogy of philosophical figures that were influential in the development of their politi- 
cal philosophy, albeit not always explicitly so, namely Heidegger, Kant and 
[Plato’s] Socrates. In doing this I particularly focus on Heidegger’s notion of truth, 
Kant’s idea of the revolution and Plato’s preoccupation with the precarious relation- 
ship between philosophy and politics. These themes have been central in both 
thinkers’ writings on the relationship between truth and politics, which underpins 
both Foucault’s engagement with the notion of parrhesia and Arendt’s configuration 
of the pariah. 
	  
	  
1.1. Heidegger’s shadow 
In his very last interview, on the occasion of the publication of the second and third 
volumes of The History of Sexuality and shortly before his premature death Fou- 
cault pithily summarised his intellectual relationship with Martin Heidegger: 
	  
For me Heidegger has always been the essential philosopher … My entire philosophi- 
cal development was determined by my reading of Heidegger … But I have never 
written anything on Heidegger … I think it is important to have a small number of 
	  	  
authors with whom one thinks, with whom one works, but about whom one does not 
write. (Foucault 1990, 250) 
	  
Heidegger was of course a fundamental philosophical encounter for Arendt: he was 
the young inspired professor whose lectures and seminars at the University of Mar- 
burg she joined in 1924, when she was only 18 years old, a philosopher she loved 
and was disappointed by and a constant presence/absence till the end of her life.5 
Unlike Foucault, Arendt wrote a number of essays on Heidegger, drew on his work 
but also seriously criticised and challenged it particularly in her last unfinished 
philosophical work, The Life of the Mind (1981). As poetically put by Arendt her- 
self in a letter to Heidegger that was never sent,6 he was the man ‘to whom I 
remained faithful and unfaithful, and both in love’ (Ettinger 1995, 1). 
Clearly, I could not possibly discuss here Heidegger’s influence on both thinkers 
in its entirety.7 As already noted, I will focus instead on the Heideggerian conceptu- 
alisation of truth, which I think is crucial in how Foucault and Arendt theorise and 
discuss the relationship between truth and politics. Firstly elaborated in his 1930 
Freiburg lecture on ‘The Essence of Truth’ (1998/1943), Heidegger’s approach to 
truth goes back to its Greek roots, where the notion of αλήhɛια [aletheia] is 
conceptualised as unhiddenness rather than correspondence. As Heidegger (2002, 8) 
configures it: 
	  
Initially, the meaning of the Greek word for truth, unhiddenness, has nothing to do 
with assertion and that factual contexture in terms of which the essence of truth is 
usually explained, i.e. correctness and correspondence. To be hidden and unhidden 
means something quite different to correspondence, measuring up, directedness 
towards … Truth as unhiddenness and truth as correctness are quite different things; 
they arise from quite different fundamental experiences and cannot at all be equated. 
	  
It is this Heideggerian conceptualisation of truth as ‘unhiddenness’, revealing some- 
thing that it is concealed, forgotten or distorted that underlies Foucault’s genealogi- 
cal investigation in the notion of parrhesia through a number of philosophical and 
literary texts in classical antiquity and beyond. In his 1982–1983 lectures at the 
College de France, Foucault (2008) investigates a number of texts, but given the 
restrictions and particular focus of this essay, in the following section I will discuss 
his engagement with Socrates’ Apologia, which constitutes according to his analysis 
a philosophical parrhesiastic moment par excellence. Interestingly enough, Socra- 
tes’ Apologia has also become a reference point for Arendt’s preoccupation with 
questions of truth and the precarious relationship between philosophy, truth and 
politics (Arendt 2006). 
	  
	  
	  
1.2. Kant and the idea of the revolution 
Kant has clearly been an influential philosophical presence for both Foucault and 
Arendt. Foucault’s secondary doctoral thesis was a translation of, as well as an 
introduction to Kant’s anthropology.8 Moreover during his penultimum course at 
the Collège de France in 1982–1983, Foucault9 discussed at length Kant’s influen- 
tial essay, Was ist Aufklärung, by linking it to his thoughts on the revolution as 
presented in The Contest of the Faculties and in Perpetual Peace.10 In concluding 
the first part of his lecture on 5 January 1983, Foucault would note: 
	  	  
it seems to me that these two questions – ‘What is Aufklärung’ and ‘What is the Rev- 
olution’ – which are the two forms in which Kant poses the question of his own pres- 
ent reality, have continued to haunt, if not all of modern philosophy since the 
nineteenth century, then at least a large part of this philosophy. (Foucault 2010, 20) 
	  
In Foucault’s view, Kant’s aforementioned essays are crucial in considering the phi- 
losopher’s relationship to politics, a theme with which he ultimately concluded his 
last lectures at the Collège de France in 1983–1984 (Foucault 2011). 
Kant has been a critical philosopher in Arendt’s late philosophical work (1982) 
and particularly in the development of judgement as a faculty of the mind that 
would become the third part of The Life of the Mind (Arendt 1981), had she not 
died unexpectedly. Nevertheless Kant’s Critique of Aesthetic Judgement (1952) is 
Arendt’s philosophical frame of reference in what for her was the most political 
function of the mind, namely judgement. As she was writing to Jaspers on 29 
November 1964, she could discern ‘a possible conceptual structure for history and 
political science’ in the Critique of Judgement that she wanted to further discuss 
with him. (Arendt and Jaspers 1993, 576) In the context of her engagement with 
the third critique, which she considered as the site par excellence of Kant’s political 
philosophy, Arendt has also discussed Kant’s influential essay on the French revolu- 
tion.11 Here again the relationship between philosophy, truth and politics is at the 
centre of the discussion. 
	  
	  
	  
1.3. Socrates’ death: philosophy and politics 
On 22 February 1984, this is how Foucault concluded his eighth lecture at the Col- 
lège de France: ‘As a philosophy professor one really must have lectured on Socra- 
tes and the death of Socrates at least once in one’s life. It’s done. Salvate animam 
meam’ (Foucault 2011, 153). But did Foucault really need to pay his debt to Socra- 
tes by lecturing on the death of the philosopher – despite the moving connotations 
surrounding this concluding sentence in the light of his actual death, only four 
months later – or is there something more in the philosopher’s death that makes the 
necessity for a course  on it a conditio sine-qua-non of philosophical teaching? 
According to Arendt, Socrates’ death colours and underpins the philosopher’s 
departure from the world in the famous allegory of the cave in The Republic; it 
therefore marks a deep rupture between philosophy and politics that will only be 
recuperated with Karl Marx’s advent in the philosophical scene: 
	  
The beginning was made when in The Republic’s allegory of the cave, Plato described 
the sphere of human affairs – all that belongs to the living together of men in a com- 
mon world – in terms of darkness, confusion and deception which those aspiring to 
true being must turn away from and abandon if they want to discover the clear sky of 
eternal ideas. The end came with Marx’s declaration that philosophy and its truth are 
located not outside the affairs of men and their common world but precisely in them, 
and can be ‘realized’ only in the sphere of living together, which he called ‘society’ 
through the emergence of ‘socialized men’. (2006, 17) 
	  
Still, what is it about philosophical life that makes it incompatible with politics and 
even if they can and should coexist – as Marx ardently argued – how is their coex- 
istence to be understood and maintained? The philosopher’s death has further been 
linked to what Foucault discussed and theorised as ‘the courage of truth’ (2009) 
	  	  
manifested in extremely risky situations and defying any kinds of risk, including 
death. In this light, Socrates’ death is for Foucault a parrhesiastic act par excellence 
but instead of closing down possibilities of a relationship between politics and phi- 
losophy, it actually creates conditions for a reconfiguration of this relationship; this 
however, comes hand in hand with a new conceptualisation of politics and philoso- 
phy, as entities now illuminated by the philosopher’s death. So how should these 
entities be perceived and how is the figure of the philosopher itself changed? This 
is where the notion of parrhesia and the figure of the pariah enter the cycle of the 
discussion. 
	  
	  
2. Parrhesia: modalities of truth telling 
Parrhesia is a Greek word and Foucault devotes a great deal of his lectures in 1982 
to locate its roots, etymology and emergence in the ancient Greek literature. Since 
there is no space in this essay for philological details or a full genealogy of the con- 
cept,12 I will rather consider two texts that become important for Foucault’s discus- 
sion: Euripides’ tragedy Ion and Socrates’ Apologia. 
In looking into a classical text of ancient Greek tragedy, Euripides’ Ion, Fou- 
cault presents and discusses the notion of the parrhesia and its significance in the 
political technologies of the individual. There are many characters in this tragedy, 
but only two parrhesiastic roles according to Foucault: Kreusa the Athenian prin- 
cess, who visits the oracle of Delphi to confront Apollo, and Ion her illegal son 
with the Delphic god. As a central character of the play, Ion is a young man, who 
serves the Delphic temple completely unaware of his origins.13 The tragedy 
revolves around the need for truth to be disclosed, while Delphi becomes the chro- 
notope par excellence for such truth seeking and disclosure: Kreusa demands from 
Apollo the truth about the fate of their son; her parrhesiastic moment is a private 
one, configured within the restrictions and limitations of her gendered role. Ion 
wants the truth about his mother because without knowing his origins, he will never 
have parrhesia, the freedom to speak the truth, which is an essential precondition 
for going into politics and excel in it. What therefore lies at the heart of this play is 
the recurrence of parrhesiastic moments and practices, risky situations wherein truth 
is being sought, negotiated, granted or denied. As Foucault pithily puts it: ‘Ion is 
entirely devoted to the problem of parrhesia since it pursues the question: who has 
the right, the duty, and the courage to speak the truth?’ (2001, 27). 
Foucault actually devotes five lectures, in January 1983 in exploring the parrhe- 
siastic questions emerging in Euripides’ Ion.14 Since it is in the parrhesiastic act 
that an individual assumes her right to speak, this practice becomes a quintessential 
precondition of freedom. In this analytical context, there are four essential themes 
constitutive of the parrhesiastic act: first is speaking the truth; second, having the 
courage to speak the truth in situations where there is a risk or danger for the truth- 
teller; third, parrhesia is a form of criticism, either towards another or towards one- 
self and it should always come from below, from the powerless (or rather the less 
powerful, if we want to keep with the Foucauldian notion of power) and finally 
parrhesia, the telling of truth, is regarded as a duty and is further related to free- 
dom. As Foucault pithily summarises it: 
	  
Parrhesia is a kind of verbal activity where the speaker has a specific relation to truth 
through frankness, a certain relationship to his own life through danger, a certain type 
	  	  
of relation to himself or other people through criticism (self-criticism or criticising of 
other people), and a specific relation to moral law through freedom and duty. More 
precisely, parrhesia is a verbal activity in which a speaker expresses [his] personal 
relationship to truth, and risks his life because he recognises truthtelling as a duty to 
improve or help other people (as well as himself). In parrhesia, the speaker uses [his] 
freedom and chooses frankness instead of persuasion, truth instead of falsehood or 
silence, the risk of death instead of life and security, criticism instead of flattery, the 
moral duty instead of self-interest and moral apathy. (Foucault 2001, 19) 
	  
In thus acknowledging truth telling as both a necessary precondition of freedom 
and a considerable risk for the truth-teller, the Greeks had created a space for truth 
to be told by introducing what Foucault has defined as ‘the parrhesiastic pact’. In 
this light, parrhesia sets up an ethical contract for both parties: the speaker will tell 
the truth without concealing anything and ‘the prince’ will listen to any harsh and/ 
or critical truth without punishing the truth-teller. In Foucault’s conceptual configu- 
ration, this pact is actually situated at the heart of what he further defines as ‘the 
parrhesiastic game’, understandably so, since the notion of truth in Foucault’s 
philosophical thought has always been a matter of ‘truth games’ (1988) rather than 
an absolute idea, form or state: 
	  
Thus the true game of parrhesia will be established on this kind of pact, which means 
that if the parrhesiast demonstrates his courage by telling the truth despite and regard- 
less of everything, the person to whom this parrhesia is addressed will have to dem- 
onstrate his greatness of soul by accepting being told the truth. This kind of pact 
between the person who takes the risk of telling the truth and the person who agrees 
to listen to it, is at the heart of what could be called the parrhesiastic game. (Foucault 
2011, 12–3) 
	  
This was the idea and practice of parrhesia in Euripides’ tragedy Ion, where ‘the 
prince’ was Apollo, the Delphic god himself, and the parrhesiasts were a young 
man and an aristocratic woman, two characters unfolding different parrhesiastic 
roles that were mostly gendered configured and constrained. Of course Foucault’s 
genealogical exploration of parrhesiastic acts in classical antiquity and beyond has 
actually revealed a series of breaches of this moral obligation in telling and listen- 
ing to the truth, which reaches its culmination with Socrates’ death. Indeed, the phi- 
losopher’s death marks a turning point in the relationship between philosophy, truth 
and politics: the Athenian demos will not tolerate Socrates’ parrhesiastic criticism 
and will give him a death sentence for endangering the city and corrupting the 
youth through his practices of truth telling. Moreover, although Socrates is offered 
the opportunity to escape, he decides to obey the laws and die as a consequence of 
his boldly manifested courage to tell the truth. 
Thus, amongst the four figures in the modalities of truth telling that Foucault 
(2009) presents and discusses – the prophet, the sage, the teacher and the philoso- 
pher15 – Socrates becomes the parrhesiast par excellence, through his decision to 
die for the sake of truth.16 What is indeed exceptional in the philosopher’s parrhesia 
is the consistency between the philosopher’s discourse and the way he conducts 
his life: logos and bios are tightly interwoven and constituted through their 
interrelation. As Flynn (1991, 108) has succinctly noted, ‘the Socratic parrhesia is 
properly philosophical in that it is  concerned with practical reason (phronesis), 
with truth and with the soul’. In Flynn’s configuration, these three components of 
	  	  
the philosophical parrhesia further correspond to  the  three  genealogical  axes 
that Foucault pursued throughout his work: power, knowledge  and  the  self 
(107, 108). 
It is actually genealogical trails of truth telling and truth-seeking through a har- 
monious coexistence between logos and bios, discourse and life that Foucault traces 
in the rest of his 1984 lectures. His particular preoccupation with the Cynics in the 
rest of the course throws light on an obscure area of the philosophical discourse: 
the aesthetics of existence as a politics of ‘true life’ (bios alêthês). In explicating the 
notion of true life, bios alêthês, Foucault draws on his Heideggerian toolbox in terms 
of how he defines alêthia: ‘that which is not hidden, not concealed is true’ (Foucault 
2011, 218), but he adds three more characteristics in his configuration: ‘that which is 
not added to or supplemented, which is not mixed […] that which is straight […] 
that which exists and remains beyond any change’ (210). What is important in Fou- 
cault’s analysis of parrhesia is that all four ‘essential values’ (219), found in the 
notion of truth, can be applied both to logos and to praxis or action: ‘This notion of 
truth – as the unconcealed, the unalloyed, the straight, and the unchanging and incor- 
ruptible – is applicable […] to ways of being, ways of doing things, ways of con- 
ducting oneself, or forms of action’ (219–20). 
Living a ‘true life’ thus becomes the parrhesiastic problem par excellence not 
just for a line of philosophical lives that Foucault examines and reflects upon, but 
most importantly for his own life as well. This is where we come full circle with 
the a posteriori moving moment of Foucault’s decision to lecture on the philoso- 
pher’s death, four months before his own death. Indeed in opening his first lecture 
at the Collège de France on 1 February 1984, Foucault feels the need to apologise 
for having delayed the start of his course for a month: ‘J’ ai été malade, réellement 
malade’ [I was ill, really ill] he says. (2009, 3) His very last words in closing the 
course on 28 March 1984 are equally moving: ‘Mais enfin, il’ est trop tard. Alors 
merci’ [But well, it is too late, so thank you] (309). As noted by Foucault’s lifelong 
partner Daniel Defert, during his medical visits in the last months of his life, Fou- 
cault’s persistent question seemed to have been: Combien me reste-t-il de temps? 
[How much time have I got?] (318) As Frédéric Gros therefore notes in his critical 
evaluation of the last course, Foucault’s last lectures have to be read in the light of 
death, both his own and of Socrates (318). 
The premonition of his own death notwithstanding, there were other conditions 
that had influenced Foucault’s preoccupation with questions of truth telling as well 
as the relationship between philosophy and politics, an issue that had become par- 
ticularly pertinent in France in 1983 in the wake of the rise of the socialist adminis- 
tration. The French intellectuals had actually been accused of being silent and 
unwilling to defend the ideas and the deeds of the socialists in power and Foucault 
alongside Simon de Beauvoir had been particularly pinned down as ‘silent intellec- 
tuals’.17 It is therefore within the specificity of the political conditions in France 
that Foucault’s lectures should also be interpreted and it is no wonder then that 
Foucault devotes a great part of his lectures to talk about the philosopher’s relation- 
ship with the prince through reflecting upon the disaster of Plato’s involvement in 
politics at the end of his life.18 What emerges as particularly important through 
Foucault’s last lectures is the legacy of changing the interest and object of philoso- 
phy altogether from a preoccupation with concepts, notions and arguments to an 
interest in life practices: 
	  	  
we can conceive of the idea of a history of philosophy which would be somewhat 
different from the history traditionally taught today [not] a history of philosophical 
doctrines, but a history of forms, modes and styles of life, a history of the philosophi- 
cal life as a philosophical problem. (2011, 210) 
	  
Interestingly enough, Socrates’ death, Plato’s late involvement in politics and the 
philosophy/truth/politics assemblage would also preoccupy Arendt’s lectures and 
writings to which I now turn. 
	  
	  
	  
3. The pariah as a truth-teller, but how do things change? 
The figure of the pariah appears throughout Arendt’s work as a courageous truth- 
teller amidst particularly risky situations. In her short essay ‘The Jew as pariah’ 
Arendt (1978) actually paints the portrait of four pariah figures: (a) the schlemihl or 
Lord of Dreams, the people’s poet as exemplified by the poetry of Heinrich Heine, 
(b) the conscious pariah as illuminated by historical figures such as Bernard Lazare, 
(c) the always suspect and here Charlie Chaplin’s cinematic hero comes on stage 
and (d) the Kafkian hero. All four figures are portrayed as outsiders of their geogra- 
phies, times and social worlds, but with differentiated attitudes, practices and 
effects. 
‘Innocence is the hallmark of the schlemihl’ Arendt notes (1978, 70), but this 
comes as no surprise for a poet-pariah, who ‘excluded from formal society and with 
no desire to be embraced within it, turns naturally to that which entertains and 
delights the common people’ (71). Being an outsider of society but at the same time 
intensely immersed in the beauties and joys of nature, the schlemihl can look at the 
socialised multitude, criticise them and laugh at them. ‘The concept of natural free- 
dom (conceived, be it noted by an outcast able to live beyond the struggle between 
bondage and tyranny) turns both slaves and tyrants into equally unnatural and there- 
fore ludicrous figures of fun’ (73). It is through the force of the schlemihl’s creativ- 
ity that freedom can be visualised. There are strong analogies here with Foucault’s 
preoccupation with the cynic philosopher, as an obscure parrhesiastic figure, whose 
‘true life’ [la vie vraie] is unconcealed, independent, straight and sovereign, master 
of itself (2009, 231). These four aspects of the cynic life are expressed through the 
cynic philosophers’ attachment to nature, their persistent refusal to compromise and 
their mockery towards all artificialities and pretensions. Still, the schlemihl’s remote- 
ness from the world, critical as it is, cannot do much, since ‘one has to admit that 
laughter does not kill and that neither slaves nor tyrants are extinguished by mere 
amusement’ (Arendt 1978, 73). 
Given the impasses that the schlemihl – as a poet-pariah can lead to – Arendt 
turns to the figure of the ‘conscious pariah’ and the way she attempts to look into 
the political significance of marginalisation and exclusion. Through political 
involvement, the conscious pariah thus becomes a rebel; moreover, her agonistic 
practices brings her in confrontation not only with the forces that marginalise her 
but also with trends of assimilation and integration, the disappearance of difference 
and people’s right to be different and claim their rights not despite their difference 
but because of it. Bernard Lazare and his involvement in the Dreyfus Affair is the 
case study that Arendt draws on in her discussion of the conscious pariah, but else- 
where it is Rahel Varnhagen that appears as a pariah figure whose life and practices 
Arendt wrote about in her habilitation, her secondary doctoral thesis (Arendt 2000). 
	  	  
As Sheila Benhabib notes, in writing Varnhagen’s life, Arendt traces an existential 
transition, ‘a move away from the psychology of the parvenu to that of the pariah’ 
(1995, 90). Indeed, in reading Varnhagen’s letters and diaries Arendt could follow 
narrative traces of the parvenu’s transformation from a subject who resists ‘fateful- 
ness’ by assimilation to an active agent, who ‘transforms difference from being a 
source of weakness and marginality into one of strength and defiance’ (Ibid.). 
But if ‘the conscious pariah’ becomes an exemplary rebellious figure for Arendt, 
why does she feel the need to stage a third figure, the suspect, who comes into life 
through Chaplin’s films? The comic elements of ‘the little man’s’ adventures bring 
him close to the schlemihl, with the exception that creativity and art are  not 
amongst his options of escaping social order. His world is real, harsh and merciless: 
breaking the law thus becomes his escapist route but it cannot take him very far. 
His dealings with the law reveal ‘that there is no relation between the offence he 
commits and the price he pays’ (Arendt 1978, 80) and thus expose ‘the dangerous 
incompatibility of general laws with individual misdeeds’ (Ibid.). Being portrayed 
as becoming able to get away with a lot, ‘the little man’ develops an impudent atti- 
tude towards the law, which might become ultimately fatal and self-destructive. 
And yet, despite his misgivings, Chaplin’s pariah also functions as a political figure 
for Arendt in that his misfortunes and adventures bring people together: they 
‘recognised in him the image of what society had done to them’ (80). By becoming 
the world’s suspect par excellence, Chaplin’s hero paves the way for the always, 
already suspect figure of the refugee, the stateless person, as well as the threats, real 
and imaginary fears and moral panics that their figure still arises and sustains. Writ- 
ten in 1944, when Arendt herself was a refugee and a stateless person, it is no won- 
der that sometimes she might have perceived herself and Blücher as figures in 
Chaplin’s movies. Indeed, the day-to-day harsh situations of her life in the begin- 
ning of her settlement in New York, with Arendt having to take a two-months 
placement with an American family, her mother getting piecework from a lace-mak- 
ing factory and Blücher ‘shovelling chemicals in a New Jersey factory’, evoke such 
images.19 
But amongst the four pariah figures of Arendt’s essay, it is the Kafkian hero that 
truly fascinates her. Having experienced the futility of the suspect’s innocence or 
the schlemihl’s escapism to either nature or art, the Kafkian pariah’s shelter and 
weapon is thinking: the spaces of contemplation. Indeed, how can one respond to 
the denunciation that ‘you are not of the Castle and you are not of the village, you 
are nothing at all’? (84) How does it feel to be ‘nothing at all’, to be denied of your 
existence? This is what the Kafkian pariah struggles with: the right to enjoy simple 
things like a home, work, family and citizenship. But ‘normal’ existence becomes 
impossible and Kafka’s pariah dies from exhaustion in the attempt to insist on the 
right to have rights. But although real life is a failure, the story of this life enlight- 
ens some of the villagers, making them see ‘that the rule of the castle is not divine 
law and, consequently, can be attacked’ (88). The villagers’ awakening is a positive 
note in Arendt’s essay whose finale is about the necessity of the multitude for the 
uniqueness of the human existence to be respected and protected: 
	  
For only within the framework of a people can a man live as a man among men, with- 
out exhausting himself. And only when a people lives and functions in consort with 
other peoples can it contribute to the establishment upon earth of a commonly 
conditioned and commonly controlled humanity. (90) 
	  	  
Written in 1944, just as the news of the concentration camps had started spreading, 
Arendt’s powerful ending opens up a field of political theorising that she went on 
elaborating till the end of her life. The four pariah figures make multiple and com- 
plex contributions in the modalities of truth telling, but they are finally evaluated as 
politically ineffective, except perhaps from the awareness, meaning and understand- 
ing that their stories can enact. It is perhaps not accidental that Arendt decided to 
abandon philosophy after she fled Germany in 1933, since the idea of the philoso- 
pher as pariah seemed to her an impossible project. She talks about it in her inter- 
view with Günter Gaus on 28 October 1964, which was broadcasted on  West 
German television: 
	  
I always mention that there is a vital tension between philosophy and politics […] a  
kind of enmity against all politics in most philosophers […] Kant is an exception […] 
I want to look at politics, so to speak, with eyes unclouded by philosophy. (1994, 2) 
	  
But of course Jaspers was never persuaded by this statement; he actually wrote fer- 
vently against it in a letter sent the day after this interview: 
	  
Your farewell to philosophy is a joke […] It’s good that you are instantly punished 
for making that statement! Your students are demanding philosophy of you and are of 
course right to do so. You’re lecturing on the Critique of Pure Reason now and on 
Spinoza next Semester. I am happy about that. If you look into all aspects of Spinoza 
you’ll see that he doesn’t have the enmity toward politics that you attribute to all phi- 
losophers except Kant. I would claim almost the opposite. All of them are very serious 
about politics […] except Epicurus […] and except for the skeptics (not all  of 
them).20 
	  
As Jaspers succinctly points out above, Arendt’s disavowal of philosophy  was 
indeed a joke, or rather a political stance she felt she had to take in publicly accus- 
ing the philosophers’ silence during the critical years of the rise of Nazism in Ger- 
many. It is in this context that she felt the need to celebrate Marxism as a catalytic 
event in the philosophy/politics troubled history, as already discussed in the first 
section of the essay. But in reconciling philosophy with politics Arendt’s route was 
via narratives and it is to the relation between narratives, philosophy and politics 
that I will now turn. 
In the last section of her essay ‘On the Nature  of  Totalitarianism’,  Arendt 
(1994) juxtaposes solitude as a sine-qua-non condition of philosophical thinking 
with loneliness as ‘a professional danger for philosophers’ (1994, 359), a situation 
where the philosopher ‘is deserted even by his own self and lost in the chaos of 
people (Ibid.). It is because of this ‘professional danger’, Arendt argues that ‘philos- 
ophers cannot be trusted with politics’ (360); driven ashtray by their will to be left 
alone, philosophers ‘sympathise with tyrannies, where action is not expected of citi- 
zens’ (Ibid.). As already discussed in the previous section, Arendt’s lived experi- 
ences as a student of German existential philosophy had given her very  good 
reasons not to trust philosophers. But having reconciled herself with philosophy 
after her emigration to the States, Arendt revisited and seriously reconsidered her 
position: ‘philosophical truth can become ‘practical’ and inspire action without vio- 
lating the rules of the political realm only when it manages to become manifest in 
the guise of an example’, she writes in her essay ‘Truth and Politics’ (2006, 243). 
There are two important Arendtian theses that derive from this influential essay: (a) 
	  	  
the force of stories in grounding abstractions and facilitating human communication 
and the emergence of meaning and (b) the political position of what Liza Disch has 
denoted as ‘situated impartiality’: in order to think politically as well as philosophi- 
cally you need a position from where to speak (1994, 218). 
Narratives are indeed at the heart of how Arendt conceptualises the political. 
Drawing on the Aristotelian notion of energeia, her thesis is that ‘action as narra- 
tion and narration as action are the only things that can partake in the most “specifi- 
cally human” aspects of life’ (Kristeva 2011, 41). Not only do stories evade 
theoretical abstractions, but they reconnect truth and politics by revealing multiple 
perspectives while remaining open and attentive to the unexpected, the unpredict- 
ability and contingency of action, the possibility of change and new beginnings, 
which is at the heart of what politics is about. In doing so, stories ultimately recon- 
figure the sphere of politics as an open plane of horizontal connections, wherein the 
revolution can once again be re-imagined. 
Stories for Arendt are thus the only tangible traces of how humans appear to 
each other and to the world ‘through words and deeds’ (1998, 198)  and  thus 
enmesh themselves in the web of human relationships. But as Arendt has noted, 
‘being seen and being heard by others derive their significance by the fact that 
everybody sees and hears from a different position’ (57). In this light, ‘impartiality’ 
or ‘objectivity’ is always situated in what Arendt calls the ‘interspace’ or the ‘inter- 
est’: you are always in-the-world-with-others.21 But what happens when this ‘world 
that lies between people’ (Arendt 1968, 4) disappears? This is the problem that 
Arendt identifies as crucial in configuring ‘dark times’ as a regime wherein ‘the 
public realm has lost the power of illumination’ (Ibid.). Arendt’s position here is 
that when living in dark times human beings need to take up a position of ‘vigilant 
partiality’ (29). Having posited the argument that academic education is entering a 
regime of ‘dark times’ in the beginning of this essay, what I want to do in its last 
section is to create a plane of consistency wherein parrhesia as an assemblage of 
practices of truth telling, the figure of ‘the conscious pariah’ and the situated posi- 
tion of vigilant partiality create conditions of possibility for following Arendt’s cru- 
cial suggestion in the Human Condition: ‘What I propose, therefore, is very simple: 
it is nothing more than to think what we are doing’ (1998, 5). 
	  
	  
4. Academics in dark times 
Following Arendt, one could indeed argue that we currently live through ‘dark 
times’ and there is already ample abundance of evidence, as well as a growing body 
of scholarship.22 Ball’s 1995 essay ‘Intellectual or technicians: The urgent role of 
theory in educational studies’ has been an important early intervention in this area 
of problematisation and thinking. Ball’s main argument was that we needed to shift 
away from ‘a technical rationalist approach’ (1995, 255) and try instead to employ 
theory so as to become once more able to see clearly and in an Arendtian mode to 
‘think what we are doing’. What Ball was suggesting back in 1995 was that ‘educa- 
tional studies is in a sorry state, and in danger of becoming sorrier’ (256), but I 
have a feeling that he had not imagined back then how ‘sorrier’ the situation would 
actually become within and beyond educational studies. The role of the academic 
as an intellectual was of course at the heart of Ball’s argument, while ‘intellectual 
isolationism’ (256) had been identified as a symptom of the problem with 
educational studies.23 
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But what is the role of the academic in dark times? And what types of politics 
can develop as a response to this? As already discussed in the second section, par- 
rhesia is entangled in a network of power relations wherein the freedom to tell the 
truth is interwoven with the risk of being exposed to ‘the powerful other’. As Sti- 
vers (2004, 21) has aptly put it, ‘the validity of fearless speech is established by its 
riskiness’. But how can ‘the powerful other’ be configured within the space of aca- 
demia, how exactly can we map the risks involved in the parrhesiastic game and 
finally what are the conditions of possibility for parrhesia in the era of ‘the cuts’? 
As already discussed in the first section, for both Foucault and Arendt, truth as 
a Heideggerian notion is about unconcealment, uncovering and in this light the poli- 
tics of truth is not about establishing valid knowledges, but rather about understand- 
ing complex configurations and truth games through which practices and discourses 
are scientifically validated and become dominant. The quest for meaning and under- 
standing is therefore a process of uncovering the veil that both covers and hides the 
material conditions and fierce power relations at play through which ‘dominant 
truths’ and master narratives’ are constituted and established. In this light, fearless 
speech is about the courage to take up a situated position and simply dare say: ‘the 
emperor has no clothes’. 
There are indeed many instances in the increasing bureaucratisation and marketi- 
sation of academic life that the parrhesiastic role of the academic would be to reit- 
erate the statement that there is less and less meaning and essence in what we say, 
write and do in our everyday lives. As a matter of fact, academics have been very 
good at reflecting upon, analysing and writing about academic performativity, audit 
cultures and the panopticisation of the academy.24 We are not short of analyses or 
theories; what we are short of is action, the mere gesture of reiteraring Bartleby’s 
simple response: ‘I would rather not’.25 
This lack of doing something other than writing, is of course an effect of the 
globalised aspect of a phenomenon, which is part and parcel of the neoliberalism 
agenda, but there is more to it. As it has been pointed out and discussed, audit cul- 
tures are not straightforward systems of domination, but rather matrices of complex 
practices, values and discourses, ‘at once obstructive and enabling’ (Strathern 
2000). Moreover academic performativity is both a regime of terror as influentially 
analysed by Ball,26 but also a psychosocial milieu of what has been discussed as 
‘academic narcissism’.27 
Performativity and audit cultures in the academy are thus entangled components 
within larger ‘assemblages of power and desire’ (Tamboukou 2010). It is I argue in 
the receding and erasure of the need for and memory of action that we are entering 
a milieu of ‘dark times’. Academic ‘resistance’ is translated into withdrawal from 
public academic spaces into archives, libraries and private studies: we opt to hide 
from the world and from each other, gradually unravelling the Arendtian web of 
human relations, which illuminates our ‘deeds and words’ and holds us together. 
This withdrawal does not initially seem to be harmful for academics as individuals; 
sometimes, it can even appear as beneficial for the intellectual who withdraws from 
the world and develops her genius and talent in writing sophisticated books and 
articles or successful grant applications. ‘But with each such retreat’, Arendt 
reminds us (1968, 4) ‘an almost demonstrable loss to the world takes place; what is 
lost is the specific and usually irreplaceable in-between’. There is a need to think 
carefully about the specificities as well as effects of losing this Arendtian ‘in- 
between’, within the spaces of the university today. 
	  	  
What is also important to recognise here is that in terms of the material and dis- 
cursive conditions of the parrhesiastic game within academia, we are part of ‘the 
powerful other’ we want to challenge and in this context the Bartlebian response, ‘I 
would rather not’, is not simply addressed to some superior hierarchies – although 
in many cases it does – but also to our peers and friends as well as to ourselves. 
We constantly need to reiterate it, but also listen to it. Parrhesia is not just about 
having the courage to tell the truth, but also to listen to it carefully, even if this 
means that we will have to inhabit the position of ‘the conscious pariah’. Truth is 
that academics as intellectuals have actually been marginalised and even erased 
from the language and the grammar of higher education policy documents (see 
Sabri 2010). In this context, more and more academics are currently inhabiting the 
three Arendtian pariah positions as configured and discussed above: academic 
escapism, as I want to call it, has indeed become a route many of us have taken up 
as a survival tactic. But we need to remember here that ‘laughter does not kill’ 
(Arendt 1978, 73) and that mere defiance cannot make things change. Here, the fig- 
ure of Socrates as a philosopher/teacher becomes crucial. Socrates’ parrhesia 
reminds us that by hiding from the world we fail in our responsibility as teachers to 
inspire young people in the quest for freedom, a problem that Blücher had raised in 
the beginning of this essay. Although fearless speech is open to everyone, academ- 
ics as teachers and pedagogues, have assumed extra responsibilities in sustaining 
the web of human relations and opening up potential sites where students can be 
educated in telling the truth as they see it, but also in listening to others. 
Here also comes that Kantian approach to the effects of seeing, remembering 
and imagining the revolution, that both Foucault and Arendt have referred to in 
their reflections on the relation between truth and politics as discussed in the first 
section above. Kant’s main argument was that the event of the French revolution 
should not be evaluated in terms of its immediate effects, or its possible success or 
failure, but rather in terms of its aura in enacting memories of revolt and hopes for 
a different future. As he was writing in a most clairvoyant way: 
	  
The revolution, which we have seen taking place in our own times […] may succeed 
or may fail […] a phenomenon of this kind which has taken place in human history 
can never be forgotten […] For the occurrence in question is too momentous, too inti- 
mately interwoven with the interests of humans and too widespread in its influence 
upon all parts of the world for nations not to be reminded of it when favourable cir- 
cumstances present themselves, and to rise up and make renewed attempts of the same 
kind as before. (Kant 2011, 182, 184, 185) 
	  
In writing about the revolution as an onlooker who had been irrevocably affected 
by its occurrence, Kant was finally flagging up the role of the philosopher as an 
enlightener, her duty being to ‘instruct people upon their duties and rights towards 
the state’ (2011, 186). Such instructors can only be ‘free teachers of right, i.e. the 
philosophers. The latter, on account of the very freedom, which they allow them- 
selves, are a stumbling-block to the state, whose only wish is to rule’ (Ibid.). Phi- 
losophers as teachers are thus entitled to enlighten people in freedom through ‘the 
freedom, which they allow themselves’, a Kantian point which reverberates with 
how Foucault highlights the importance of the link between logos and bios, dis- 
course and life in the philosopher’s parrhesia, but also with Arendt’s configuration 
of ‘the conscious pariah’ and her position of ‘vigilant partiality’ in acting and 
speaking. In this light, the parrhesiastic game within the academia is more complex 
	  	  
in terms of the difficulty of pinning down ‘the powerful other’, but also in terms of 
the risks involved, including the failure of becoming ‘a stumbling-block to the 
state’, and therefore an instructor of freedom, a point that brings the discussion full 
circle to Blücher’s question as posed in the beginning of this essay. 
	  
	  
4.1 Academic spaces and the enactment of politics 
In this essay, I have considered the problem of truth telling through the notion of 
parrhesia as developed and explicated in Foucault’s last lectures at the College de 
France (1982–1983 and 1983–1984) and the figure of the conscious pariah that 
runs throughout Arendt’s work (1978). In tracing connections and tensions in the 
way the two thinkers explore questions and dilemmas around the courage to tell the 
truth in philosophy and politics, I have expressed the fear that academics in the UK 
have entered an era of ‘dark times’: as we gradually withdraw from practices of act- 
ing and speaking together, conditios sine-qua-non of the political in Arendt’s 
thought, we also fail in our task as teachers to inspire our students in the pursuit of 
freedom. In raising the  need for the  importance and urgency  of action, what I 
finally suggest is that maybe, this is again ‘a time of struggle between two ways of 
thinking: thinking evasively and thinking to the point … a time of conflict between 
theory that plays fast and loose with practice and theory that learns from practice’ 
(Havel 1992, cited in Stivers 2004, 23). 
	  
	  
Notes 
1. Blücher to Jaspers, 5 September 1961 in Arendt–Jaspers (1993, 451). 
2. Arendt met Blücher (1899–1970) in Paris; they were both exiled and stateless Germans 
fleeing Nazism. They got married in Paris, shortly before they fled together to New York 
in 1941. Blücher took several manual jobs as a non-speaking English immigrant in New 
York, before he started teaching at the New English School for Social Research and later 
at Bard College in the 1950s. Apart from some reviews, he never published but after his 
death Arendt arranged for his lectures at Bard to be transcribed with a publication pro- 
ject in mind. Arendt died unexpectedly in 1975 and Blücher’s lectures were never pub- 
lished, but they can be accessed today at the Blücher Archive at Bard College: http:// 
www.bard.edu/bluecher/lectures/index.htm. 
3. Ibid., 452. 
4. Villa (1992) has considered affinities and tensions between Foucault’s conceptualisation 
of power and the Arendtian configuration of the public sphere; Tully (1999) has consid- 
ered Foucault and Arendt alongside Wittgestein and Skinner in reconsidering citizenship, 
freedom and democratic participatory politics; Allen (2002) has traced affinities in Fou- 
cault’s and Arendt’s theorisation of power, agency and subjectivity, arguing in particular 
that the two thinkers’ different take on power is complementary rather than oppositional 
in the constitution of subjectivity and agency and Stivers (2004) has drawn connections 
between Arendt’s notion of ‘vigilant partiality’ and the Foucauldian notion of parrhesia, 
while Braun (2007) has explored correlations between temporality in Arendt and modern 
biopolitics in Foucault. 
5. I refer here of course to Heidegger’s political behaviour and particularly his brief 
endorsement of Nazism in 1933, which Arendt herself has publicly criticised (1994, 
187, n. 2), despite her later generosity in forgetting and forgiving. For the Arendt– 
Heidegger relationship see Arendt and Heidegger (2004), Ettinger (1995) and Maier- 
Katkin (2010). 
6. Arendt to Heidegger, 28 October 1960, not sent, Hannah Arendt Literary Trust. 
7. For an overview of Heidegger’s influence on Foucault, see amongst others, Milchman 
and Rosenberg (2003) and Elden (2001). See also Hinchman and Hinchman (1984) for 
an excellent discussion of Heidegger’s influence on Arendt’s thought. 
	  	  
8. Foucault’s complimentary thesis was submitted to the University of Paris, Sorbonne in 
1961 and published in 1964, but was only translated in  English  in  2007  (Foucault 
2007). 
9. See Foucault (2010, 6–39), see also Foucault (1984). 
10. The essay ‘What is Enlightenment’ was written in September 1784 and was published in 
December in the German journal Berlinische Monatschrift. All three Kant’s essays that 
Foucault discusses are included in Reiss’ edited collection of Kant’s Political Writings 
(2011). 
11. In her posthumously published Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, first given at the 
New School for Social Research in the 1970 Fall semester, Arendt discusses at length 
Kant’s views on the French Revolution, particularly referring to Kant’s The Contest of 
the Faculties (Part II, Sections 6 and 7) and Perpetual Peace (Appendix II). See Arendt 
(1982, sessions, 7–11, 40–68). 
12. For a detailed discussion of the etymology and a literary genealogy of parrhesia, see 
Foucault (2011). 
13. In the mythic plot of the play, Kreusa, daughter of the king of Athens Erectheus was 
seduced or raped by Apollo when she was a young girl; she gave birth secretly and 
abandoned the infant. Under the orders of Apollo, Hermes rescued Ion and safely carried 
him to Delphi to grow up in the holly atmosphere of the temple. Later in life Kreusa 
visits the temple with her husband Xouthos, who is a foreigner in Athens, albeit king of 
the city through his marriage with the princess. The royal couple wants to know whether 
they will ever have a child and Apollo’s answer to Xouthos is that he already has one, 
the first man he will meet on leaving the oracle and of course this man turns out to be 
Ion. After certain misunderstandings Xouthos presents himself to Ion as his father and 
asks him to go to Athens with him and eventually become his heir. Ion hesitates: how 
can he rule a city, if he is a foreigner? He needs to know who his mother is. 
14. See Foucault (2011), end of lecture four till lecture eight (61–147). The notion of par- 
rhesia was also the theme of six lectures at Berkeley in the fall of 1983, given as part 
of Foucault’s seminar ‘Discourse and Truth’ (Foucault 2001). 
15. These four modalities of truth-telling and their corresponding figures are discussed in the 
very first lecture of the 1984 course (2011, 1–31). 
16. As Thomas Flynn has noted, the four roles in truth-telling can coexist or overlap in one 
person, they are not mutually exclusive (1991, 104). 
17. See Gros’ commentary on these debates in contextualizing the 1982–1983 course (Fou- 
cault 2010, 390, n. 39). 
18. See Foucault (2010), Lectures on 12 January, 9 February, particularly the section on Pla- 
to’s political autobiography, (2010, 212–9) and 23 February 1984. 
19. See Young-Bruehl (1982), particularly Chapter 5, 164–73. 
20. Jaspers to Arendt, 19 October 1964 (Arendt-Jaspers 1993, 572). 
21. For references to the ‘interesse’ in Arendt’s work, see inter alia, the Human Condition 
(1998, 182) and Men in Dark Times (1968, 31). 
22. See amongst others Strathern (2000), Morley (2003), Olssen and Peters (2005), Archer 
(2008), Ball and Exley (2010), Holmwood (2011) and Peters (2011). 
23. The role of the intellectual has of course a genealogy of its own, which goes back to 
Plato, but its exploration goes beyond the limits of this essay. 
24. See amongst others, Ball (2006) and Unterhalter and Carpentier (2010). 
25. I refer here of course to Herman Melville’s well-known story: Bartleby the Scrivener: A 
Story of Wall Street. 
26. See Ball (2006) for an overview of his overall work on academic performativity. 
27. See Matthew Reisz’s article ‘Whither Art: Vanity is killing social sciences and the 
Humanities’ in Times Higher Education, 29 October 2009. See also Rustin and Rustin 
(2010). 
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